Was Communism in Czechoslovakia unique? Historian Jacob Mikanowski on Czechoslovakia’s distinctive story
Jacob Mikanowski is a historian, author, and journalist who has written the book Goodbye, Eastern Europe: An Intimate History of a Divided Land. A Czech translation of the book has been published in early 2025. Mikanowski takes us through Czechoslovakia's uniquely complex but, at the same time, intriguing history. From its diverse ethnic roots at the time of its founding to Alexander Dubček’s “socialism with a human face” and the Velvet Revolution, we look at Czechoslovakia’s trajectory and what remains of it in the political memory of the citizens of the Czech successor state. So, what is the legacy of Communism in the region? Was Václav Havel alone in advocating for a reformed socialism? And is there really something unique about the inherent essence of citizens living in post-Communist Europe?
In Goodbye Eastern Europe, you mix personal reflections with historical analysis. Could you touch on your own experience as someone with roots in the region, and how that influenced the writing of your book?
“Sure. The subtitle of the book is An Intimate History, and I wanted it to be told from a specific point of view—my own, situated in eastern Europe. I wanted to use my family's history to illustrate some of the themes and topics that I believe connect to the entire region.
“My family is Polish, but with a more complicated background. It's a mix of Polish and Jewish, Polish-Hungarian, with a bit of Czech and German. There are different ethnicities, different languages, and over time, different parts of the region coming together. There are also different political affiliations, both Communist and anti-Communist, leading to stories of espionage and collaboration, as well as various political aspects. I think it's extraordinary, yet in a way, it’s also a typical story—this kind of mixed family background, where historically opposed parts come together due to circumstance and history. I thought this particular story of my family would offer the reader a way into understanding the complicated fate that makes the region as a whole so extraordinarily interesting.”
And probably contributing to that as well is the Austro-Hungarian rule, right? There's this kind of intermixing of nationalities and just kind of also there's this unique role of Nazism, Communism, and now also specifically speaking about, well, the Visegrád states, part of the European Union. So in what ways turning to the Czech Republic, would you say, is it emblematic of the larger eastern European experience?
“The Czech Republic has an interesting position within eastern Europe—almost outside of it. It’s on the westernmost edge of the region, not just geographically, as it stretches past Vienna. Culturally and historically it’s an outlier, especially when it comes to its economic and social history. It industrialized much earlier than most of the rest of the region. The story I’m telling covers a region bounded by Germany, Russia, Scandinavia, and the Balkans—this broad swath of imperial space that was once Habsburg, but also part of the Russian and Ottoman Empires. Czechia lies right on the edge of that.
“Most of these societies remained peasant societies well into the 20th century, but that wasn’t true for Czechia. It was, in many ways, a precocious example of social, economic, and political development. Czechia pioneered a style of nationalism that became dominant throughout the region—a nationalism rooted in culture rather than in statehood. It began with the revival of language and culture, and over time, through organic efforts, worked toward establishing that language and culture as the foundation of a state. This pattern can be seen across eastern Europe.
“So, on one hand, Czechia is an outlier. But on the other hand, it’s not just typical—it’s also the root of many developments in the region as a whole. That Bohemian example resonates across countries, all the way from Estonia to Albania.”
That's interesting. So, with the founding of Czechoslovakia, as we know, there were many nationalities mixed in. We had, as far as Ruthenians go, Sudeten Germans, and everything in between. And you're saying that it was really tied to language. How do you think that has evolved now with the Czech Republic, especially after the Velvet Revolution and the Velvet Divorce, becoming a sovereign state of its own? There are populists in the region now who are mobilizing behind the idea that there is something unique about being Czech. But in its founding, you’re touching on how it was much more tied to language and culture, rather than, let’s say borders. Is that an accurate depiction, would you say?
“I think so. Looking at the big picture across eastern Europe, 200 years ago, there were no nation-states—just the land of empires. The entire region I’m discussing was part of one of three empires: Ottoman, Habsburg, or Russian, with the tiny exception of part of Montenegro. Now, almost all of it consists of nation-states, many of them quite homogeneous, quite small, and moving toward uniformity. And for me, that’s really part of the tragedy of the 20th and 21st centuries.
“It’s interesting how this happens, even in microcosm. States that were once multinational, like Yugoslavia in its tragic form and Czechoslovakia in a smaller, more peaceful form, have tended to fall apart, especially along linguistic lines. This fragmentation continued even into the '90s and '00s. It seems hard to imagine a future in eastern Europe where nations are not just plural but also multinational, bringing kindred nationalities together.
“That process began in the early 19th century, during the Napoleonic Wars, with movements like the Czech Bohemian Renaissance and the Bohemian Revival, and it seems to have continued into the present day. Maybe they were ahead of their time, but for me, not in a positive way.
But it seems politicians are relying much less on the ideas that the founders [of Czechoslovakia], like Tomáš Masaryk and Edvard Beneš, were focused on. They believed Czechoslovakia could be a place where multiple nationalities could coexist peacefully. The founders adhered to the language of the Bohemian Revival, the Great Awakening, and so on. But it seems they were willing to make excuses for why these different nationalities could be included in Czechoslovakia, whereas today, that idea has largely faded. So what do you think changed where now there is more of an opposition to that kind of difference from some political parties?
“Yeah, I think once you start, it's that process—a chain reaction—that began pulling the empires apart. It continues with multinational states like Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Every ethnicity that considers itself a nation ultimately wants to realize that, and that drive for national identity continues to shape the region. The EU has halted some of that disintegration.
“But the Yugoslav idea and elements of Czechoslovakism still surprise me in how quickly they lost currency after the fall of the Iron Curtain. But I think nationalism has been the strongest ideology in the region for 150 years, and it continues to be so today.”
So, it's not that surprising then. But turning to another shared experience—let's talk about the Czech experience under Communism. It’s still very controversial today among historians, especially when it comes to explaining its influence on the region. Other countries in eastern Europe had different experiences under Communism, but they're often lumped together in one category. Can we use this case, perhaps with Poland, which you might be more familiar with, and compare and contrast? How would the Czech experience under Communism be unique?
“There are a lot of odd commonalities across the region, though, as I mentioned, the Czech Republic and Czechoslovakia have something distinctive about them. The 1948 revolution meant that Communism arrived somewhat later than in the rest of the region, and it was implemented in a much more gradual, "generous" way. This brings it a bit closer to the Yugoslav experience, but without the Tito-Stalin split. Czechoslovakia had this trajectory where the 1948 coup gave Czech, or Czechoslovak Communism, a stronger popular mandate and a somewhat higher degree of radicalism in the '40s, compared to Poland, where there was much more social opposition and armed resistance against Communism, which was very much led by the Red Army. In Poland, this resistance actually led to a somewhat weaker imposition of Communism.
“There's an apocryphal saying attributed to Stalin, where he supposedly said that putting Communism in Poland fit together like a saddle on a cow. There’s some truth to that—there was caution in how it was imposed because of the amount of social resistance, which came from the people to a significant degree. In contrast, Czechoslovakia had, especially in the 1950s, a higher degree of radicalism, with the targeted destruction of books and literature from the former era.
“At the same time, there was a Stalinist template that was consistent across the region, from Poland to Czechoslovakia to Hungary, and even Albania, which was in the Stalinist block until 1960. The same kind of leader cult, the same kind of party control over society and culture—it was all part of the same pattern, though there were differences in the degree and specifics of how it played out. Show trials occurred throughout the region, though less so in Poland, partly because the ruling party was more cautious due to the level of resistance there, including armed resistance. There was also some in Romania, but the consistent pattern was there across the region, with variations.”
Then there was also the issue of "socialism with a human face" with Alexander Dubček, obviously around the time of the Prague Spring. You could see this in Czechoslovakia, and this was also during the time of the Velvet Revolution. Even figures like Václav Havel, before the Velvet Revolution, were still advocating for a type of socialism, rather than a complete shift toward, I don’t know if I’d call it "Western capitalism," but something along those lines.
So, would you say that this was significant? How significant was it that they tied it to hedonic tendencies in the West, capitalism, and all these kinds of ideas in one bucket, while also advocating for a reformed socialism within the country, rather than a total break from the West? Was this something unique to Czechoslovakia, or were there similar trends of thought elsewhere?
“There were similar trends of thought across the region. In Poland, especially in the '70s, before Solidarity, what you would often hear was that the goal wasn't to bring on capitalism but to reform and democratize socialism—introducing democracy to an economic system that people weren't entirely at odds with. In the '70s, there was actually more prosperity across the bloc, which helped keep things stable for a while. However, things started to fall apart in Poland, and it got much worse there than in countries like Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
“In Hungary, too, there was much more politically pragmatic language. Part of that reflected the real viewpoint of the time, but it was also driven by pragmatic politics. The Soviet Union was such a dominant player geopolitically that many people couldn't imagine a world without it. For much of the '70s and into the late '80s, the idea of the Soviet Union not being around seemed almost unimaginable. So, politically, countries tried to find a way to navigate being a kind of buffer zone, playing a game of yes to economics but no to certain kinds of politics. Poland, again, was probably the boldest in veering away from the system, but if you look back at the '70s, the core of the ideas there was very much in line with Václav Havel and the dissident thought of that time: more democracy, but not more capitalism.
“That shift in focus depended on economic circumstances and politics in different countries, particularly in the '80s. Hungary was relatively similar to Czechoslovakia in its approach, while Poland was a different case entirely. Romania and Albania, on the other hand, had far less room for dissent and far less imagination of a world without their leaders.”
And then there was a democratic transition in the 1990s, but many people have been talking about this kind of Homo Sovieticus affecting this transition, or even into EU membership. So, would you say there's a specific way EU membership affects post-Communist mentality in the region? How is that intermixing of this kind of post-Communist people, the general apathy of the Homo Sovieticus?
“You know, the idea of Homo Sovieticus was very much a concept of the '90s, and I think it’s been proven false, especially in the countries that joined the EU. What we discovered is that societies that seemed pretty passive and unfamiliar with capitalism, with modern business practices, turned out to be incredibly entrepreneurial. The Polish and Czech examples are particularly significant in this regard. These countries were able to develop sophisticated democratic politics, which don’t always equate to conflict-free politics, but democracy became pretty quickly rooted. Alongside that, a hard-charging business world emerged.
“It took some time, but now there’s talk of the "Polish tiger," and the Czech economy, while not consistently perfect, is very well integrated into western Europe and the EU. The EU itself has really transformed places that, in my lifetime, seemed decades behind, and now they’re charging forward. Romania has one of the fastest-growing economies in Europe, and it’s transforming year by year. So, the idea of Homo Sovieticus as a solid template has proven to be much more a creature of circumstance. It existed within the Soviet system, but once new opportunities arose, and new avenues opened, it really vanished.
“On the flip side, if you go to places where those opportunities and that context haven’t changed, like Belarus, Moldova, or eastern Ukraine, you can still feel the imprint of Homo Sovieticus. You’ll find places where the best times in people’s lives were in the Soviet Union, particularly during the Brezhnev years. I was in Moldova recently, and in the countryside, older people would say, ‘I’m a Soviet person. My homeland was the Soviet Union, and the best times of my life were the '70s and '80s.’ And they have a point. Things haven’t necessarily gotten better for everyone. Depending on where you are or who you are, it can still feel challenging. But especially in the countryside, that Soviet legacy feels very heavy.”
Do you believe, moving forward, there's potential for a more unified future with the Visegrád states feeling more represented in the EU? Maybe this is a post-Fico, post-Orbán scenario, but it's difficult to predict, especially with different politicians potentially emerging in the region. Additionally, there are various parties, like Austria's FPÖ and Germany's AFD, that complicate the picture. So, maybe having a unified Europe isn't so much about the Visegrád states clinging to the EU, but rather about the EU bloc remaining democratic. What would you say about that kind of unified future for the bloc? Is there more potential for European integration?
“That’s a complicated issue. I think the expansion of the European Union has had a transformative and deep effect on the countries that joined, especially between the 1990s and 2013. However, since 2013, no new countries have joined. Croatia was the last candidate state to become part of the EU, and now most of the other candidates, which include most of eastern Europe, are in line but seem like they’ll remain in line forever. The “drawbridge” has been pulled up, not so much in the Visegrád states, but really in Paris, maybe to a third degree. There's simply no political will within the EU to continue expanding.
“Now, eastern Europe is sharply bifurcated. On one hand, you have a group of states that are developing very quickly—economically and politically—and assuming greater political leadership. While this is not always consistent, it seems to be the trend. On the other hand, there’s a part of eastern Europe that remains stuck, waiting, and either under the shadow or the active threat of Russian domination, as in Ukraine's case, or living in the aftermath of the Yugoslav wars, now thirty years later. The Yugoslav conflict hasn’t been resolved; it’s just festering everywhere except for Croatia and Slovenia.
“Europe hasn’t been able to find a lasting solution that allows these states to start acceding to the EU, and I think that’s a major problem. This is where the Visegrád Group could show real leadership and think beyond just their own interests to the region as a whole. The EU’s expansion is important for markets to grow and for democracy to spread, and ultimately, I believe the EU is good for democracy. Hungary, though, presents an ambiguous case in that regard, and there are ways in which EU funding has fueled some negative developments. Still, overall, the European Union expansion has been a very positive project, and it’s disappointing that it feels stuck in second gear right now.”
Is it possible that with a second Trump administration, we could see the EU unifying more? Similarly to Canada, where a more active European Union has been coming together in response to a polarized society—something that wasn't as true under Prime Minister Stephen Harper—people across the aisle are now agreeing more on supporting "Buy Canadian" rather than American products. Could something similar happen with the EU, where a group forms in response to tariff threats and so forth?
“I’d love to say yes, but right now, everyone is guessing. People aren’t sure what's coming, or what the administration's intentions are. I would like to think that this uncertainty might motivate a more independent and unified course.
“The experience of the first Trump administration was that it led to a lot of empty rhetoric—lots of ‘we must do this, we must do that,’ but not much action. Hopefully, this time will bring a change, but at the same time, it’s still an unpredictable situation. Domestically and internationally, people are scratching their heads. We're all waiting and seeing. Every week seems to bring startling new decisions, both here and abroad. Right now, people are just waiting to react, not planning ahead. But the planning and execution will likely have to happen soon.”
