What is the future of Czech–Slovak relations under Babiš and Fico?
The two successor states of Czechoslovakia find themselves in a period of recalibration. With Andrej Babiš on the verge of being appointed as prime minister in Prague and Robert Fico reasserting his influence in Bratislava, questions abound over how these two nations will manage their ties amid what were differing approaches to the Russia–Ukraine war, EU politics, and regional cooperation. I spoke with political scientist Jan Kovář to get a sense of what could be in store between the two countries.
Let’s start with basic Czech–Slovak relations in recent months. They’ve really diverged on foreign policy, specifically on Russia, which is probably the biggest obstacle between the two lately. There’s also this rule-of-law difference; Fiala has criticized that, but it’s less in the spotlight. It’s mainly the different stance on Russia that we tend to focus on. So, would you expect anything to change under Babiš? Do you think there will be any ripples between them in the years to come?
“Well, to begin with, the day-to-day Czech–Slovak ties are resilient: people, businesses, culture, and so on. It’s really the government-to-government track that has been choppy because of Ukraine. With the probable change toward a Babiš-led government in Czechia, I would expect a more pragmatic approach toward Bratislava, a more pragmatic relationship between Prague and Bratislava, or between Czechia and Slovakia.
“Likely, there will be a restart of structured governmental talks, so a general improvement, at least in terms of signaling. But in substance, the core difference remains: the issue of Russia and Ukraine. I would imagine there will be a rapprochement of Prague toward Bratislava, but this doesn’t mean a complete overhaul or full alignment on foreign policy, especially on Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.
“So, it’ll be warmer atmospherically, with some procedural changes, but continued policy divergence on Russia–Ukraine, though perhaps a smaller divergence than before. Babiš will still have to balance international commitments with domestic politics. His voters are not all against helping Ukraine or taking a mild stance toward Russia, while in Slovakia, public opinion is somewhat different. Surveys show that in Slovakia, a higher number of people claim the war is Ukraine’s fault. So Babiš will have to balance this carefully. Many of his voters are not pro-Russian at all, quite the contrary.”
Do you think that difference will show up in the Patriots for Europe group in the EU Parliament? We know that Orbán’s Fidesz is there, Babiš’s ANO, and now there’s talk about SMER–SD joining as well. So, two questions: how do you think the EU will react to that? How might they approach Russia policy, and will veto power become more of a hurdle? And second, do you think Czech–Slovak relations will hold up, given these different populations, with Czechs tending to favor support for Ukraine more than Slovaks?
“If you look at the EU level, Patriots for Europe exists only in the European Parliament. Membership there doesn’t necessarily affect Council votes or European Council decisions. Overall, Patriots for Europe, even though they’re the third largest group, have a poor reputation. Many mainstream parties avoid cooperation and effectively build a cordon sanitaire, excluding them from committee posts.
“So being in that group doesn’t bring clear benefits with EU partners and doesn’t offer much influence in Parliament. In practice, on foreign policy, this isn’t crucial, since the European Parliament has limited influence over EU foreign policy. What really matters is behavior in the Council, [specifically] how countries vote and implement Council decisions.
“You asked if we might expect more vetoes, or alignment between Czech, Hungarian, and Slovak positions on foreign policy issues. I don’t think that will be the case. There might be some case-by-case coordination, but not systematic alignment.
“Robert Fico and Viktor Orbán both engage in a kind of cultural war against the EU, which feeds their popularity. Orbán has done this for a long time and has a big audience for it; Fico is doing it now too. Babiš, on the other hand, isn’t openly pro-European, but I think personally he wants to stay in the EU, not least because of his business interests. He’s pragmatic and likely to remain so.
“If using vetoes would harm his pragmatic interests in the EU, he won’t do it just to signal defiance. I don’t see Czechia blocking sanctions or new anti-Russian measures, though it probably won’t take the lead on new initiatives to support Ukraine either.
“As for relations with Fico, I think Babiš and Fico will align tactically on some EU issues — the Green Deal, migration, and related topics — but will diverge on Ukraine policy and how hard to push Brussels. I expect a friendlier tone than under Fiala and Fico, some ad hoc cooperation case by case, but no seamless coalition like a revived Visegrád Three. The Patriots for Europe affiliation won’t somehow change how leaders act in the Council.”
Lastly, before, progressives and moderates were happy with Czech–Slovak relations thanks to the Pavel–Čaputová intersection, when people were more positive about the two countries’ presidencies. Now, with Babiš and Fico, it’s the center-right and some moderates who feel more optimistic. Given that, and the recent criticism Czechs and Slovaks have directed at each other, a sort of ripple we haven’t seen since the Velvet Divorce, do you think Czechs and Slovaks will think less of each other in the future?
“From a general or societal perspective, I don’t see massive divergence ahead. It’s more of a wave with ups and downs. The gaps between those ups and downs may be wider now, but they’re often followed by renewed closeness. You mentioned Čaputová, but there have been other examples of close cooperation between Czech and Slovak leaders in the past.
“In a nutshell, I think there’s a general societal assumption that the two nations are close, and that feeling is still shared widely. I don’t expect any major drifting apart; they remain each other’s most compatible partners linguistically and on other issues."
And, of course, the Czechoslovak Republic [in its various forms] as well.
“Exactly. So, I think these are just temporary fluctuations. Maybe over the very long term they’ll grow further apart, but in the short and medium term, I don’t see it being an issue.”
